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EPILOGUE
AID IN DYING IN MONTANA EPILOGUE:
THREE TAKEAWAYS*
James C. Nelson**
After the Symposium concluded, I was offered the opportunity to write
an article for the summer issue of the Montana Law Review. This issue was
going to be devoted to the topic of aid in dying. For personal reasons related
solely to my own prior commitments and schedule, I respectfully declined
that gracious invitation. For whatever their worth, I offered a copy of my
foregoing, as-delivered keynote remarks, and those were accepted as a sub-
stitute. My thanks for that.
Since the invitation was offered, however, I felt I had some license to,
at least, briefly put in writing my personal takeaways from the excellent
Symposium panel presentations. I have three observations.
First, my congratulations to Kathryn Tucker, Mark Connell, and Pro-
fessor Anthony Johnstone as well as to the various panelists. All did a thor-
oughly professional and commendable job. This Symposium represented an
unparalleled opportunity to become informed about aid in dying in Montana
and the Baxter v. State1 opinion ten years post-decision—as seen through
the eyes of the lawyers, physicians, legislators, and academics in the field.
Most important, though, were the compelling and heartrending first-person
experiences shared by those who have suffered with their loved ones
through the maelstrom of an incurable final illness.
* Editors’ Note: This Article is an epilogue containing Justice Nelson’s personal takeaways on
aid in dying following the Montana Law Review’s Honorable James R. Browning Symposium on Aid in
Dying in Montana: A Decade of Practice Following Baxter v. Montana, held at the Alexander Blewett
III School of Law on September 6, 2019.
** James C. Nelson is a retired Justice of the Montana Supreme Court.
1. 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
1
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Second, one comment during the Q and A following one of the panel
discussions sent a chill up my spine. To paraphrase, it was along the lines of
intuiting the Montana Supreme Court’s supposed broader intentions in ren-
dering its Baxter decision.
Based upon my nearly 20 years of serving on the Court, I can state that
opinion writing, especially in important cases like Baxter, is a tedious, de-
liberative, complex, and often adversarial process—all of which, save for
oral argument, is completed within the chambers of the Court and is not
open to the public or to the attorneys involved. I participated in that entire
process in Baxter and am probably as familiar with the intentions of the
Court as anyone.
It is with this experience in mind I suggest the plain language of the
Court’s written opinion in Baxter should be taken at face value. It says what
it says; no more, no less.
I mention this only to emphasize that the Baxter Court did not create
some sort of right to aid in dying. Indeed, if the Court had intended to do
that, it would not have done so by implication. The Court would have sim-
ply affirmed District Court Judge Dorothy McCarter’s opinion holding
there is a constitutional right to aid in dying grounded in Montana’s rights
of individual privacy (Article II, section 10) and inviolable human dignity
(Article II, section 4).2
Rather, the Court’s focus was on the assisting physician’s conduct.
The Court interpreted Montana statutes, extant at the time, in holding that
consent could be raised as a defense by a physician charged with deliberate
homicide or another felony resulting from prescribing for his or her incur-
ably ill patient a life-ending medication to be taken (or not) by the patient at
a time and place of the patient’s choosing. To the extent it created any-
thing—and that really is not an apt verb—Baxter simply affirmed there was
a consent defense available to prescribing physicians charged with deliber-
ate homicide. In short, Baxter was a statutory interpretation.
Baxter’s impact on affected patients was collateral—albeit, expected.
Importantly, however, the direct consequence of Baxter was to allow pre-
scribing physicians to raise a criminal defense to a criminal charge resulting
from allegedly criminal conduct. The decision was physician-focused, not
patient-focused.
Indeed, in its various attempts to legislatively overrule Baxter, that is
how the Legislature read and understood the Court’s opinion as well. Those
attempts, including the one in the 2019 session (HB 284, sponsored by Rep-
resentative Carl Glimm),3 addressed and criminalized the conduct of the
2. Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 WL 6627324 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008).
3. H.R. 284, 66th Leg. (Mont. 2019), available at https://perma.cc/YVA7-Y8Q3.
2
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prescribing physician or otherwise made the consent defense unavailable
against criminal charges filed in assisted dying cases. The government,
while very effectively frustrating the patient’s most personal end-of-life de-
cision, brought its full weight to bear against the involved doctors. Incur-
ably ill patients would have been, unfortunately, the collateral damage from
the government’s intrusion into the practice of medicine. Thankfully, none
of these legislative attempts to overrule Baxter were successful.
While panelist-legislator Representative Glimm and I are polar oppo-
sites on a “right” to and need for aid in dying, we are, at least, on the same
page in understanding what the Baxter Court’s decision was, and was not,
about.
And that leads me to my third and probably most important take-away.
It was clear from the forthright presentations of panelists-physicians, Drs.
Colette Kirchoff, R.D. Marks, Deric Weiss, and Lonny Shavelson, that
medical aid in dying is actually the practice of medicine at the end of a
patient’s life. This practice involves a very intimate, and often long-stand-
ing, physician-patient relationship. It involves much counseling and discus-
sions with the patient and often with members of the family. It is not prac-
ticed willy-nilly or by happenstance, any more than medicine is generally
practiced in that manner.
The physicians who engage in this medical practice are compassionate,
principled, and provide aid in dying only when it is in the best interests of
the patient and in accord with the patient’s competently made and clearly
articulated desire to end his or her personal suffering in the final stages of
an incurable illness. Most of these patients are in or are involved with hos-
pice or some palliative care program, and all want to address their situations
proactively while still able to self-administer the life-ending medication. It
is a serious matter, taken seriously by all concerned.
Physicians practicing medical aid in dying are not involved in assisting
suicide or in any way encouraging suicides—much less the problems of
depressed veterans, teenagers, or those suffering from mental disability or
illness (all of which are factually and substantively different from the situa-
tions of aid in dying patients).
Suicide (a problem in which Montana is at the top of the charts) and
medical assistance in dying are substantively two different things. Medical
aid in dying produces a dignified, peaceful, and otherwise inevitable and
natural death resulting from incurable illness. Medical aid in dying does not
involve assisting those who would take their own lives in an untimely and
unnatural manner because of physical or mental issues that various
branches of medicine can address.
Too often, suicide (with all that term’s pejorative baggage) and the
medical practice of aid in dying are conflated so as to support political
3
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attacks on the latter. In truth, however, to characterize medical aid in dying
practice as assisting suicide is little more than ignorant and disingenuous
fearmongering.
Moreover, these panelist-physicians highlighted access problems and
barriers incurably ill patients face in learning about and requesting a medi-
cal aid in dying option. Problems and barriers in many cases are grounded
in ignorance, misinformation, and misperception on the part of not only the
public, but on the part of medical practitioners as well. Access and barrier
issues also involve a dearth of physicians willing to perform this sort of
practice and, often, difficulty in obtaining life-ending medications from
pharmacological sources.
Importantly, medical aid in dying must be understood and accepted for
the practice of medicine that it actually is and as a medical practice subject
to medically informed standards of care—the same as any other medical
practice. There needs to be much more public and professional education in
this regard.
Moreover, the focus of the government efforts in this matter must be
turned from punishing physicians for practicing medicine in the best inter-
est of their competent, incurably ill patients and, rather, redirected to pro-
tecting and honoring patients’ informed and considered determinations
about ending their physical and mental suffering in a dignified manner.
Indeed, viewed through this lens, stress and anxiety are typically re-
moved from the patient’s shoulders when he or she obtains the life-ending
medication. Just having it ensures the patient retains ultimate control over
his or her destiny—even if the medication is never used (and often it is not).
To the contrary, when a medical aid in dying option is not available, it
is clear that patients often consider, and some resort to, a more violent way
of ending their own suffering and lives.
Finally, medical aid in dying provides a dignified and peaceful closure
for not only the incurably ill patient, but, equally, for the patient’s family
and friends who are able to say their final good-byes and expressions of
love and support to their loved one personally, timely, and in a deliberate
and predetermined process.
Those are my three takeaways from this Symposium.
In closing, I note that the Symposium was recorded. I hope that this
record will be preserved and made available for viewing by Continuing
Legal Education groups, by legislators, by lawyers and judges, and by
members of the public. I urge any legislator, member of the public, lawyer,
academic, and student interested in this very important issue to watch the
video.
I believe that it is absolutely imperative that Montanans retain the abil-
ity to take advantage of medical aid in dying a dignified and peaceful death
4
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in cases of final, incurable illness. Ultimately, aid in dying is a medical
option; it is not a mandate. And as my keynote remarks and special concur-
rence in Baxter indicate, I firmly believe that aid in dying is a constitutional
right under Montana’s Constitution. However this ability is retained,
whether under the present Baxter rationale or as a constitutional right, the
medical practice of aid in dying must be preserved—indeed encouraged.
My thanks again to the Montana Law Review for devoting an issue to
aid in dying and for allowing me to make these remarks.
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